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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE .%S TO THE HABIT OF ONE KILLED OR
INJURED TO PROVE OR DISPROVE His NEGLIGENCE. - This note is lim-
ited in scope to the admissibility of evidence dealing with the habits of
care or negligence of the party injured or killed. Evidence of this
nature is of importance in establishing freedom from negligence, or con-
tributory negligence, as the case may be, on the side of the party plain-
tiff in an action for damages for injury or death, caused by negligence.
No effort shall be directed toward the matter of the defendant's habit
NOTES
for care or negligence. Nor are those cases in which there is an en-
deavor to prove specific acts of negligence, or care, to be treated herein.
A specific act does not per se suffice to establish a habit or custom.
Most of the reported cases involve habits of negligence, but, of
course, habits of caution and prudence are of equal, if not greater, evi-
dentiary weight. Professor Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence,' goes
so far as to question whether acts of negligence can be anything more
than casual or occasional. But in Wallis v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Company,2 it is said: "Experience, however, will not support this
theory. It may be said, however, that prudence and caution in matters
involving exposure to danger may more readily become habitual from
the incentive always present to follow the path of safety." This dis-
tinction is not always apparent in the cases. The courts frequently dis-
cuss habits of care, or negligence, in a general manner. However, for
the purpose of classification, the cases in this note shall be treated with
this distinction present.
Direct evidence assumes an important role in this work. In con-
templation of the cases to be dealt with, dir&ct evidence means that
given by eyewitnesses to the accident. Moreover, as announced in
Lowry v. Chicago & North Western Railroad Company,3 "where the
plaintiff is alive and not proven to be insane," he is a source of direct
evidence. Thus, with the addition of the expression "lack or presence
of direct evidence" into the question so far limited and described, its al-
ternative nature results in rendering it apparent in various forms. These
forms, which will be treated hereafter in the order enumerated, are:
habit of care where there is direct evidence, habit of negligence where
there is direct evidence, habit of care where there is no direct evidence,
and habit of negligence where there is no direct evidence. There is
much contrariety of opinion on these situations. The subject already
described has been dealt with similarly elsewhere.4
The first of these situations was encountered in a leading New York
case.5 The plaintiff's intestate, as he was about to walk across the de-
fendant's street car tracks, was struck by the defendant's trolley car
and fatally injured. The defendant admitted its negligence but through
its witnesses claimed that the decedent was contributorily negligent.
Evidence was therewith offered on the side of the plaintiff to prove that
the decedent was habitually careful in crossing city streets. In the case,
there was ample direct evidence. The New York court held that evi-
dence as to the habit of care of the party injured was inadmissible where
1 1 Wioxoo, EviDExcE (2d ed. 1923) § 97.
2 184 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 408 (1921).
3 248 Ill. App. 306 '(1928).
4 Notes (1913) 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684; Notes (1921) 15 A. L. R. 125.
5 Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N. Y. 50, 98 N. E. 209 (1912).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
there was direct evidence. In a thorough opinion, an unanimous court
admitted the probative value of such evidence, but announced that the
latter did not outweigh the "inconvenience of a multitude of collateral
issues, not suggested by the pleadings, the trial of which would take
much time, tend to create confusion... and would tend to distract the
jury and lead them away from the main issue to be decided." More-
over, it was asserted, "after all the testimony of this character was in,
the fact would remain that, as no one is always careful, the subject of
inquiry, although careful on many occasions, might not have been care-
ful on the occasion in question." This general rule is adhered to in
most jurisdictions, 6 but some courts apply it with modifications. Where
the direct evidence was slight,.it has been held that proof of a man's
habit of using care tends to repel the defense of his contributory negli-
gence.7 Evidence of this nature is sometimes allowed to rebut evidence
that the injured party was in the habit of placing himself in a position
where he.might more easily be injured.8 An Indiana court held: "It is,
no doubt, true that such evidence would not be competent to excuse
negligence; but ... it would be competent on the measure of damages.
The loss from the death of a careful, experienced railroad man would be
greater than that of one who was careless and inexperienced." 9
The second situation as to the admissibility of evidence of habit
arises when a party to a litigation attempts to admit proof of the habit
of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The prime requisite in such
a case, whether the court perndts such evidence or not, is that the al-
leged habit be a possible cause of the injury or death. If it is not, the
court will, without delay, declare the evidence irrelevant and inadmis-
sible.10
The decisions, in the light of this -second situation, are similar in
both reasoning and result with those already treated in regard to the
8 Harriman v. Pullman-Palace Co., 29 C. C. A. 194, 85 Fed. 353 (1898);
Price v. Warner, 1 Penne. (Del.) 462, 42 AtI. 699 (1899); Central Ry. & Banking
Co. v. Kent, 87 Ga. 402, 13 S. E. 502 (1891); Lowry v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., 248 I1. App. 306 (1928); Adams v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,
93 Iowa 565, 61 N. W. 1059 (1895); Junction City v. Blades, 1 Kan. App. 85,
41 Pac. 677 (1895); Langworthy v. Township of Green, 88 Mich. 207, 50 N. W.
130 (1891); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hamilton, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 42 S.-W.
358 (1897); Spiking v. Cons. Ry. & Power Co., 33 Utah 313, 93 Pac. 838 (1908);
Carter v. City of Seattle, 19 Wash. 597, 53 Pac. 1102 (1898).
7 Bush v. Brewer, 136 Ark. 246, 206 S. W. 322 (1918); Missouri P. Ry. Co.
v. Moffatt, 60 Kan. 113, 55 Pac. 837 (1899).
8 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 42 S. W. 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
9 Pittsburg, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Parish, 28 Ind. App. 189, 62 N. E.
514 (1902); Mott v. Davis, 90 W. Va. 613, 111 S. E. 603 (1922).
10 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. Co. v. Sparks, 81 Ark. 187, 99 S. W. 73 (1906);
Ga., Midland & G. R. R. Co. v. Evans, 87 Ga. 673, 13 S. E. 580 (1891); Mays-
ville & B. S. Ry. Co. v. Willis, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1249, 104 S. W. 1016 (1907) ; Hill
v. Snyder, 44 Mich. 318, 6 N. W. 674 (1880).
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first situation. No great distinction is drawn between the offer to show
habit of care, or of negligence, where there is direct testimony. This
conclusion is substantiated by the case of Lexington Railway Company
v. Herring." The action was brought for personal injuries sustained
by the plaintiff when the defendant's street car suddenly and negligent-
ly jerked forward as the plaintiff was in the act of boarding it. The
defendant attempted to introduce evidence to show that the plaintiff
was in the habit of boarding cars while they were in motion. There
was considerable direct evidence of the accident in the case. Under
these circumstances, the court rejected the evidence. In its opinion it
announced: "Nearly every person is at times guilty of some negligeiht
act, and frequently a person prompted by entirely different motives
and moved by dissimilar influences will do the same thing, and if evi-
dence of previous similar acts was admitted, the plaintiff should be per-
mitted to explain, if possible, the reasons or the motives prompting
him to do each particular act. This would inject into the trial of the
case numerous collateral issues and would result in, not only confusing
the minds of the jury, but in diverting their attention from the issue
presented in the pleadings that they were called upon to try." In
Baker v. Irish,' the court reached the same result; and added that,
"men do not usually risk life and limb without motive, and the fact
that a man has done so once, or oftener, does not warrant the deduc-
tion that he did so on the occasion in question." These two cases
represent the general holding throughout the United States.13  But
where the evidence is conflicting, some courts have admitted evidence
of habit of negligence.14 A California court held, where there was a
dispute as to whether the plaintiff jumped off the street car or-was
pushed off, that the evidence as to his negligent habit of jumping off
the car was admissible. It was said: "a sensible man called upon,
out of court, to determine whether or not a certain person had, on the
occasion in question, carelessly jumped off a moving car, and finding
the direct testimony as to the matter conflicting, would naturally and
properly give some weight to the fact that the person was in the habit
11 29 Ky. L. Rep. 794, 96 S. W. 558 (1906).
12 172 Pa. 528, 33 A. 558 (1896).
18 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Ennis, i49 C. C. A. 227, 236 Fed. 17 (1916);
Birmingham Ry., L. & Power Co. v. Selhorst, 165 Ala. 475, 51 So. 568 (1917);
Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Slate, 23 Ga. App. 225, 97 S. E. 878 (1919); Linck v.
Scheffel, 32 iL App. 17 (1899); Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68
N. E. 238 (1903); Kaillen v. N. W. Bedding Co,, 46 Minn. 187, 48 N. W. 779
(1891); Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City & N. Ry. Co., 69 N. Y. 195, 25 Am. Rep.
171 (1887); International & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Ives, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 272, 71
S. W. 772 (1903); Propsom v. Leatham, 80 Wis. 608, 50 N. W. 586 (1891).
14 Craven v. Cen. P. Ry. Co., 72 Cal. 345, 13 Pac. 878 (1887); Parkinson v.
Nashua & L. Ry. Co., 61 N. H. 416 (1881); Hannibal & S. J. Ry. Co. v. Preston,
132 Mo. 111, 33 S. W. 783 (1896); Allard v. N. W. Contract Co., 64 Wash. 14,
116 Pac. 457 (1911).
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of alighting from cars in that manner." ' Texas, which ordinarily
follows the general rule, allowed such evidence in a case to prove in-
toxication, but there was already considerable evidence that the plain-
tiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident, so the fact was proved
without habit evidence." In Gibson v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids &
Northern Railway Company,"7 it was stated that such evidence "tended
to prove negligence," and it was allowed to go to the jury. The direct
evidence in the case was slight, however.
The third situation arises where there is no direct evidence and proof
of a habit of care is offered. When there is no direct evidence of the
accident, the courts are confronted with a more persuasive appeal for
the admittance of such evidence. The necessity for proof, and the ab-
sence of contradictory and direct testimony, strengthens the probative
value of habitual conduct of care. In Wallis v. Southern Pacific Rail-
road Company,'8 there was no direct evidence for a short space of time
just before the decedent was struck and killed by a train as he was
driving a wagon across the defendant's tracks. The court ruled that,
in the absence of direct testimony, evidence as to the decedent's habit
of care in crossing railroad tracks was admissible. In an exhaustive
opinion, it was stated that the main argument against admitting such
evidence was that it raised collateral issues of which the opposing party
had no prior notice. In rebuttal, it was pointed out that: "This con-
dition, however, arises in numerous instances in nearly every trial on
the introduction of probative facts, collateral in nature, and of which
the ultimate facts pleaded give no inkling." The court further justi-
fied its stand by announcing that: "Men are accustomed to weighing
and acting upon such evidence of conduct in their everyday affairs.
Recognition of its force is seen in the adoption by the law of many
presumptions based on common experience, such as the presumption
that a letter properly deposited in the mails has reached its destination
in due time, and the presumption that the regular custom of a business
has been followed." The holding of this case represents the decided
numerical authority, and the American weight of authority.' 9 Green-
wood v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company,"- ' enunciates an opinion
concurring with the majority, but carefully points out that it is only
evidence of habit of care, and not evidence of general character which
is admissible. There are many decisions to be found which do not
15 Craven v. Central P. Ry. Co., 72 Cal. 345, 13 Pac. 878 (1887).
16 Southern Traction Co. v. Kirksey, 222 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
17 107 Iowa 596, 78 N. W. 190 (1899).
18 184 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 408 (1921).
19 Monadnock Mills v. Fushey, 140 C. C. A. 72, 224 Fed. 386 (1915); Nawn
v. Boston & M. Ry. Co., 77 N. H. 229, 91 Atl. 181 (1914); McNulta v. Lockridge,
32 Ill. App. 86 (1889); Platter v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. Co., 162 Iowa 142,
143 N. W. 992 (1913); Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447, 34 Am. Rep. 690 (1837).
20 77 N. H. 82, 88 AtL 217 (1913).
NOTES
allow the entrance into the trial of this type of evidence. Many of
these holdings, however, cannot be sustained as dissenting from the
majority ruling. Frequently, such evidence has been rejected on the
grounds that it relates merely to specific acts and not habit,21 or that
the evidence was concerned oly with the general character for care.22
Nevertheless, there is a minority holding definitely against the admit-
tance of such evidence.- It is reasoned that the mere proof that a man
has done one thing carefully many times in his life does not prove that
it was so done on the occasion when he was not witnessed. This was
said to be so in spite of man's strong instinct for self-preservation.
Further, it is said that the evidence does not serve to prove the fact
in issue; and lastly, that the delay and inconvenience of collateral issues
does not warrant its admittance. 23
The decisons in regard to the fourth and last situation to be dis-
cussed in this note, the admissibility of habit evidence to show care-
lessness when there is no direct evidence, are not numerous. Those
cases holding that even though there was direct testimony, still evidence
of habit of negligence was admissible, would seem a Jortiori to be au-
thority for allowing such evidence where there is no direct evidence.
Granting the latter, the courts have considered, in the cases decided,
that the sounder policy is to exclude such evidence even though there
is no direct evidence available. In Louisville & Nashville Railway
Company v. McClish,2 4 the action was brought against the railroad
for the death of the plaintiff's decedent after being struck and killed
by the defendant's train. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.
Nevertheless, evidence of the decedent's habit of carelessness in jump-
ing upon moving trains was not allowed. The court held that the evi-
dence should be confined to his acts at the time of the accident which
were capable of being directly or circumstantially proved. Further
reasons given in this decision were that it created collateral issues, and
brought uncertainty and false inferences into the cause. This view has
been followed in other jurisdictions. 25 Kroy v. Chicago Rock Island
& Pacific Railroad Company,2 6 has been cited as upholding the op-
posite rule, but this cannot be so broadly stated. This case did allow
evidence that the decedent was one of the defendant's trainmen who
21 Gray v. Chicago, K. I. & Pac. R. R. Co., 143 Iowa 268, 121 N. W. 1097
(1909).
22 Erb v. Popritz, 59 Kan. 264, 52 Pac. 871 (1898).
23 Morris v. East Haven, 41 Conn. 252 (1874); Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.
v. State, 107 Md. 642, 69 AUt. 439 (1908); Parsons v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. Ry.
Co., 117 N. Y. S. 1058, 133 Am. Dec. 461 (1909).
24 53 C. C. A. 60, -115 Fed. 268 (1902).
25 Mullville v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 19 Mont. 95, 47 Pac. 650 (1897);
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. v. Clayberg, 107 IEI. 644 (1883); Great Western
Coal & Coke Co. v. McMohan, 43 Okla. 429, 143 Pac. 23 (1914).
26 32 Iowa 357 (1871).
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participated in the negligent habit of uncoupling cars while still in
motion. However, the facts of the case show that the decedent was
uncoupling the cars in that manner when he was killed. The evidence
in this case was used to show the decedent's assumption of risks, and
not to prove that it was the cause of the accident.
The precise reason for generally allowing evidence of care where
there is no direct evidence, and not so generally admitting evidence
of habit of carelessness where there is no direct evidence, cannot be
found in the cases cited. The cases which draw no distinction between
habit of care, or habit of negligence, might be cited as supporting a
rule that evidence as to careless habits where there is no direct evidence
is admissible. But perhaps the reason is to be found in Professor Wig-
more's theory that acts of negligence are usually nothing more than
casual or occasional, and that man's instinct for self-preservation is too
strong and apparent in humanity to permit evidence which tends to
show that it is not.
Edwin D. O'Leary.
ADvERSE POSSESSION - REQUIREMENTS - EFFECT.-One method
of obtaining title to lands is by adverse possession, which is the dis-
seisin of the true owner by the adverse holder. This method has been
purely statutory since the beginning of law. Until the Statute of Mer-
ton, 20 Henry III, c. 8,1 one had to trace his title to Henry I. The
Statute of Merton provided that one had to claim from Henry II and
by the Statute of Westminister I, c. 39,2 from the time of Richard I.
In 1540, 32 Henry VIII, c. 2, provided that one must be in possession
for sixty years, at which time title would pass. The Statute of James
I, c. 16 3 provided, "that no entry shall be made by any man upon
lands, unless within twenty years after his right shall accrue." 4
This statute of limitations remained the law in England until 1874
when by 37 and 38 Victoria v. 57, s. 1, the limitation was lowered to
twelve years instead of twenty. 5
I 1154 A. D.
2 1275 A. D.
3 1623 A. D.
4 By 21 Jac. I, c. 16, a peaceable possession for 20 years takes away the right
of entry. In which case a release of actions will create a good title, for no writ of
right can be brought for the fee simple after such release. An uninterrupted pos-
session for 20 years not only gives a right of possession which cannot be divested
by entry but also gives right of entry to the possessor. Stocker v. Burney 1 Ld.
Raym. 741; 2 Salk 421.
5 For a complete exposition of the nature and origin of adverse possession un-
der the old common law see: Walsh 783; Digby (5th ed.) 427; Tiffany 1917; 2
POLLACx & MAi.Aw, HisT. or ExoLisH LAW; Blackstone, iii, pp. 178, 188, 192,
196; 3 CRUIsEs DrossT 484.
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In the United States the period of limitation varies. A few statutes
still maintain the old common law requirement of twenty years, while
others have a fifteen year limitation,0 and still others have a short term
statute requiring other conditions to be performed. 7
There is an acceptance by all the authorities that in order to bar the
owner from recovering from an occupant in adverse possession, the dis-
seisor must have been in possession for the period prescribed by statute,
and that this possession must be actual, open, notorious, visible, con-
tinuous, and hostile.8
6 Fifteen year Statute of Limitation:" Co N. GE,. STAT., (1930) § 6003;
CARROLL'S KEN. STAT. (Baldwins Revision), (1936) § 2505; MrN. STAT., (1927)
§ 9187; NEW YORK CiVIm PRAc. AcT (Cahill, 1937) § 38; Com'.ED OKLA. STAT.
(1921) § 185; PUBLic LAws OF VT. (1933), § 1642; VA. CODE (1930) § 5805; GEN.
STAT. OF KAN. (Carrick 1935) c. 60, § 304.
7 The general short term statute provides for a payment of taxes on the
property possessed. See REVISED CODE OF ARIz. (Struckmeyer 1928) § 2054; ARK.
DIo. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6942; Crvm CODE OF CALI. (Deering, 1937)
§ 321; GA. GEN. CODE (1933) § 406; I.L. REVISED STAT. (Bar Ass'n. Ed. 1937) c.
83, § 6; CODE OF IOWA (1935) § 11007; COwri-an LAWS OF MICH. (1929) § 3466;
MIm. STAT. (1927) § 9187; REVISED STAT. OF Mo. (1919) § 1305; REVISED CODE
or MONT. (1935) § 9024; COMiwLED STAT. Or NEBR. (1929) c. 76, § 311; ORE. CODE
(1930) c. 1, § 201; TENN. CODE (Williams. 1934) § 8583; TEx. STAT. (Vernon,
1936) § 5513; REVISED STAT. OF UTAH (1933) c. 104, § 2. The period of limitation
in these statutes varies from one year to ten years although the majority of the
states have set it at seven years. Although Indiana has added the requirement of
paying taxes it has not shortened the period of time, see BURNS, IND. -STAT., (1933)
§ § 602, 1314.
8 Toerner v. Texas Co. 70 Fed. (2) 359, (1934); Montgomery v. Spear, 117
So. 753, 218 Ala. 160 (1928) ; Sheehan v. All Persons etc., 80 Cal. App. 393, 252. P.
337 (1927); Haymaker v. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co., 81 Colo. 168, 254 P. 768
(1927); Pepe v. Aceto, 119 Conn. 282, 175 A. 775 (1935); Delaware Land & De-
velopment Co. v, First and Central Presbyterian Church of Wilmington, 16 Del. Ch.
410, 147 A. 165 (1929); Sanders v. Alford Bros., 92 Fla. 719, 111 So. 278 (1926) ;
Branch v. Central Trust Co. of I1. 320 Il. 432, 151 N. E. 284 (1926); White v.
Board of Comm'rs of Owen County, 87 Ind. App. 536, 162 N. E. 61, (1928); Mont-
gomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N. W. 150 (1926); Abart v. Wilson, 211
Ky. 682, 277 S. W. 1007 (1925); Clayton v. Rickerson, 160 La. 657, 107 So. 569
(1927); Peper v. Traeger, 152 Md. 174, 136-A. 537 (1927); Distasio v. Gervagio.
255 Mich. 418, 208 N. W. 176 (1926); Daniels v. Jordan, 161 Miss. 78, 134 So.
903, (1931); Pioneer Cooperage Co. v. Dillard, 332 Mo. 798, .59 S. W. (2d) 642
(1933); Ferguson v. Strandley, 89 Mont. 489, 300 P. 245 (1931); Aynes v. Bantz.
114 Neb. 226, 206 N. W. 754 (1925); Burricher v. Westienfsky, 103 N. J. Law
340, 135 A. 890 (1927); McMahon v. Morse, 135 Misc. 236, 237 N. Y. S. 361
(1929); McKay v. Bullard, 207 N. C. 628, 178 S. E. 95 (1935); Crossman v. Fos-
ter, 44 Ohio App. 78, 183 N. E. 925 (1931); Coats v. Riley, 154 OkI. 291, 7 P.
(2d) 644 (1932); Houck v. Houck, 133 Ore. 78, 283 P. 25 (1927); Baxter v.
Girard Trust Co., 288 Pa. 256, 135 A. 620 (1927); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v.
Searson, 137 S. C. 468, 135 S. E. 567 (1926); Lahore v. Forbes, 59 S. D. 12, 238
N. W. 124, (1931); Sipes v. Sanders, 17 Tenn. App. 162, 66 S. W. (2d) 261
(1934); Gibbs v. Lester, 41 S. W. (2d) 28 (Tex. Com. App. 1931); Scampini v.
Rizzi, 106 Vt. 281, 172 A. 619 (1934) ; Woody v. Abrams, 160 Va. 683, 169 S. E. 915
(1933); Wells v. Parks, 148 Wash. 328, 268 P. 889 (1928).
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In those cases involving mistake as to boundary the courts have been
unable to agree whether or not there must be an intention to disseise
the true owner. In French v. Pearce,u a Connecticut case, the plaintiff
and the defendant were adjoining property owners claiming under the
same grantor. The deed to the defendant described his boundary "as
from a butternut tree a straight line to Platt's corner ... " The de-
fendant however contended that he had claimed beyond this boundary
for a period of more than fifteen years as required by the statute.
There was no fencing in of the property by either the plaintiff or the
defendant. The plaintiff contends that since the defendant did not in-
tend to claim the property adversely he could not then plead the statute
as a bar to the recovery of the property. The court held that the
necessary element was not the intent of the defendant to wrongfully
disseise the plaintiff but rather a possession that is hostile to that held
by the plaintiff. "I agree with the learned court that the intention of
the possessor to claim adversely is an important ingredient.' 0 But the
person who enters on the land believing and claiming it as his own, does
thus enter and possess. The very nature of the act is an assertion, of
his own title, and a denial of the title of all others. It matters not that
the possession was mistaken, and had he been better informed he would
not have entered upon the land." 11
On the other hand the Maine courts have taken the opposite view
and maintain that there must be a wrongful intent. In Preble v. Maine
Central Railroad Company,'2 the defendant, by mistake, occupied land
that was beyond the boundary specified in a deed that he had granted
to the plaintiff railroad. In the course of the examination the defendant
admitted that he had no intention to claim this property but rather that
it was a mistake. The court stated what is considered the majority
opinion today. "The rule is that one who by mistake occupies for
twenty years or more, land not covered by the deed with no intention
9 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1931).
to Moir v. Bailey, 146 Ark. 347, 255 S. W. o18 (1920); Philbin v. Carr, 75
Ind. App. 560, 129 N. E. 19 (1920); McLester Bldg. Co. v. Upchurch, 180 Ala. 23,
60 So. 173 (1912); Holland v. Nance, 102 Tex. 177, 114 S. W. 346 (1908); Lath-
rop v. Lavern, 83 Vt. 1. 74 A. 331 (1909); Union Trust & Deposit Co. v. Paul-
hamus, 74 W. Va. 1, 81 S. E. 547, (1914).
11 One may acquire title by adverse possession to land adjoining his lot,
though he-takes and holds possession of it under a mistake as to the location of
the boundary. Rernert v. Shirk, 163 Ind. 542, 72 N. E. 546 (1904); Richardson v.
Watts, 94 Me. 476, 48 A. 180, (1901); Jordan v. Riley, 178 Mass. 524, 60 N. E. 7
(1901); Baty v. Elrod, 66 Neb. 735, 92 N. W. 1032 (1902); Contra; Muller v.
Mills Co., ill Iowa 654, 82 N. W. 1038 (1900); Conrad v. Sachett, 8 Kan. App.
635, 56 P. 507 (1899); Murdock v. Stillman, 72 Ark. 498, 82 S. V. 834 (1904).
12 85 Me. 260, 27 A. 149 (1893).
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to claim title beyond his actual boundary wherever that may be, does
not thereby acquire title by adverse possession to land beyond its true
line." 13
In summing up the various decisions and reviewing the courts' atti-
tude one can readily see that the courts themselves are confused as to
whether or not the intent to disseise is necessary. At one moment they
are loath to reward the wrongdoer and at another they require that a
tort be committed and for such tort they reward the tort-feaser thus
placing a premium on dishonesty. Perhaps the reluctance of some of
the courts to grant possession to persons holding property by mistake
is due to the fact that it is not a difficult matter to make a mistake as to
the true boundary.
The fallacy in these cases appears to be the introduction of an ele-
ment in adverse possession that does not have any existence at all since
the mere possession beyond the boundary would seem to be all that is
necessary to give the adverse claimant a claim to that property. If the
courts find it necessary to discover whether or not there is a wrongful
intent it will necessitate the exploration of the mind of the adverse hold-
er with a confusing of the jurors as a consequence. The better rule, as
laid down-in French v. Pearce, that the intent is manifested by the very
fact that the disseisor holds and claims the property as against the true
owner regardless of intent, is beginning to receive support in many of
our modem courts.
Some jurisdictions add to the above requirements the necessity of
claim or color of title. The law on this question may be succintly stated
by quoting from Justice Daniel in Wright v. Mattison.'4 "Color of title
and claim of title are often confounded; the terms being used as if syn-
onymous, whereas in fact they are different things. 'Claim of title' is
where one enters and occupies land, with the intent to hold it as his own
against the world, irrespective of any shadow or color of right or title
as a foundation for his claim.15 'Color of title' is the semblance or ap-
pearance of title by which in reality, is not. They are distinct from,
13 There must be an intent to hold and claim title to land, to constitute ad-
verse possession. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 169 Mo. 471, 69 S. W. 283 (1902);
Beer v. Plant, 1 Neb. 372, 96 N. W. 348 (1901); Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781,
42 S. E. 916 (1902); Kirby v. Kirby. 236 Ill. 255, 86 N. E. 259 (1908); Delacey
v. Commercial Trust Co., 51 Wash. 542, 99 P. 574 (1909); Waldo v. Wilson, 173
N. C. 689, 92 S. E. 692 (1917); Silman v. Joseph, 9 La. App. 32, 118 So. 776
(1928).
14 18 How. 50, 15 L. Ed. 280 (1855).
15 Claim of title is considered necessary in order to show intention to occupy
adversely. Carrcey v. Hennessy, 74 Conn. 107, 49 A. 910 (1901); Maple v. Stev-
enson, 122 Ind. 368, 23 N. E. 854 (1890); Hummell v. Adams, 153 Mo. 440, 55 S.
W. 95 (1900); Gillespie v. Gillespie. 149 Ala. 184 (1907); Page v. Bellamy, 222
Ill. 556, 78 N. E. 938 (1906); Arthur v. Humble. 140 Ky. 56, 130 S. W. 958
(1910); Bellatti v. Bichardt, 228 N. V. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920).
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but supplementary to each other. Color of title without claim, is of
little effect. Claim of title without color may ripen into title to the land
actually occupied, while, with it, it may ripen into title, not only of the
land actually occupied, but to all described in the color of title, if that
actually occupied be a part thereof." 16
At common law color of title is not necessary to adverse possession
but there must be a claim of title to oust the true owner. 17 Color of
title is required by those states having short form statutes of limita-
tion.' 8 There is a conflict as to whether this color must be evidenced
by a written instrument, 19 but some courts have held that a written in-
strument is not necessary to give color of title but that it may be created
by acts in pais.20 Another point on which the courts cannot agree is
whether or not there must be good faith in acquiring the color of title,21
but they are unanimous in holding that the conveyance need not be
valid.2
2
16 "Persons entering under color of title though having actual possession of a
part thereof, has constructive possession to boundaries defined provided that no
one else is in possession." Liberty Coal & Coke Co. v. Lewis, 52 Fed. (2d) 655
(1931). Accord: Marsh v. Grogg, 228 Ala. 269, 153 So. 219 (1934); Union Saw-
mill Co. v. Pagen, 175 Ark. 559, 299 S. W. 1012 (1927); Louisville Cooperage Co.
v. Collins, 214 Ky. 247, 280 S.W. 106 (1926) ; Inhabitants of Nantucket v. Mitchell,
271 Mass. 62, 170 N. E. 807 (1930).
17 As stated Supra this claim of title is necessary at common law to show the
intention on the part of an adverse possessoi to oust the rightful owner of his
right to the land. See: Wolfe v. Langford, 14 Calif. App. 359, 112 P. 203 (1910);
McCurdy v. Rich, 76 Ind. App. 469, 132 N. E. 315 (1921); Iseman v. Iseman,
228 Ky. 116, 10 S. W. (2d) 613 (1928).
18 The following courts have interpreted the statute as making color of title
essential to obtain the benefit of the short term statute. Horn v. Horn, 234 InI.
268, 84 N. E. 904 (1908); Campbell v. Miller, 165 N. C. 51, 80 S. E. 974 (1914);
Beale's Heirs v. Johnson, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 119, 99 S. V. 1045 (1908) ; Adams v.
Pearce, 218 Ala. 525, 119 So. 236 (1928); Fitschen Bros. v. Noyes Estate, 76
Mont. 175, 246 P. 773 (1926).
19 A few courts explicitly state that the color of title must be evidenced by
an instrument in writing but it is presumed that there will be such an instrument.
Street v. Collins, 18 Ga. 470, 45 S. E. 294 (1903); Sullivan v. Scott, 73 Colo. 451
216 P. 515 (1923); Erickson v. Crosley, 100 Neb. 372, 160 N. W. 04 (1916);
Baber v. Baber, 121 Va. 740, 94 S. E. 209 (1917).
20 Those acts in pais that are considered to give a color of title are really acts
that amount to a claim of title and not color. Bleinerhassett v. Town of Forest
City, 117 Iowa 680, 91 N. W. 1044 (1902); Slater v. Reed, 37 Ore. 214, 60 P. 709
(1900); Helvey v. Tillis, 136 Calif. App. 644. 29 P. (2d) 430 (1934); Sprott v.
Sprott, 110 S. C. 438, 96 S. E. 617 (1918).
21 These cases hold that there must definitely be good faith in acquiring the
color of title. West v. Green, 15 La. App. 216, 131 So. 595 (1930); Fitschen Bros.
v. Noyes Estate, 76 Mont. 175, 246 P. 773 (1926).
22 Taylor v. Smith, 121 N. C. 76, 28 S. E. 295 (1897); Theisen v. Qually, 42
S. D. 367, 175 N. W. 556 (1919); Byron v. Riley, 154 Ga. 580, 114 S. E. 642
(1922); Wright v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 118, 82 So. 132 (1919).
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It is not necessary that land be held adversely under claim or color
of title for the statutory period by one person provided the possession
be held continuously by successive persons in privity. In Sherin v.
Brackett,23 the court said, "the rule laid down by a great majority of
the courts and by the text writers, and supported by the weight of au-
thority, and which must be regarded as the true rule, is that privity be-
tween successive adverse holders is indispensable."
This privity includes the vendee tacking to the vendor's possession
as described in the deed;*" the tenant's possession being that of the
landlord;2- and one taking by way of descent as heir or other legal rep-
resentative."8
. When the claimant is in possession for the statutory period the next
question is just how does title pass? Some states specifically provide by
statute that the title passes. " 7  By 21 James I, c. 16, the title imme-
diately passes and most of the courts in England have adhered to this
rule.2  In interpreting the law in this country the general rule is that
the title passes to the disseisor to the extent of his claim or color of
title.Y0 Very few states adhere to the rule that the statute is a mere
bar to the action. There is one Tennessee case on record where the
court explicitly stated the rule as being that the statute is a mere bar to
the action and that the right of entry still existed in the true owner.30
23 36 Minn 152, 30 N. W. 551 (1886).
24 Bugner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 280 I1. 620, 117 N. E. 711 (1917);
McHugh v. Albert Hansen Lumber Co., 145 La. 421, 82 So. 302 (1919); Robert-
son v. Baylon, 214 Mich. 27. 181 N. W. 989 (1921); Stanaland v. Horne, 165 Ga.
685, 142 S. E. 142 (1928); Jeffries v. Sheehan. 242 Mich. 167, 218 N. W. 70;
(1928); Conaway v. Daly, 106 N. J. Law 207, 148 A. 719 (1930).
2 Powers v. Malovazos, 25 Ohio App. 450, 158 N. E. 654 (1927).
2f If the decedent's heir takes possession of tfie property and remains in pos-
session for such a period that with the possession of the decedent the statute has
run, such heir obtains the title. Redemeyer v. Cunningham, 61 Calif. App. 423.
215 P. 83 (1923); Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. S09. 00 S. E. 993 (1916);
Lundquist v. Eisenman, 87 Colo. 584. 290 P. 277 (1030); Abbott v. Mars, 277
Mass. 122, 177 N. E. 829 (1931).
27 The following states have a specific statute on this point which expressly
ztates that title passes; Ariz.. Calif., Ga., Tex.. and N. J.
28 Taylor v. Hardy, 1 Burr. 60; Stokes v. Berry, 2 Salk. 421.
29 Guaranty Title & Trust Corp. v. U. S.. 264 U. S. 200, 68 L. Ed. 636, 44
Sup. Ct. 264 (1924); Milardo v. Branceforte, 100 Conn. 603, 145 A. 573 (1929);
Capra v. Viola, 16 La. App. 350, 135 So. 599 (1931); Gardner v. Gardner, 257
Mich. 172, 241 N. IV. 179 (1932); Tiffany v. Babcock 51 R. 1. 350. 154 A. 784
(1931).
30 Wallace v. Hannum 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 443, 34 Am. Dec. 659 (1839).
This cas.e was later overruled by Earnest v. Little River Lumber Co., 109 Tenn.
427, 75 S. W. 1122 (1902). The later case explains that the reason for the pas-
sage of the act concerning the limitation of actions on real property was because
of the confusion that arose in Wallace v. Hannum. The court quotes the pre-
amble to the Act as expressly stating that the intent of the legislature was to pass
title.
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Therefore, if a person other than the rightful owner is in continuous,
actual, open, visible, notorious, and hostile possession for the statutory
period such person gets title to the land. The earlier cases in most jur-
isdictions added the requirement of the intention of the claimant to dis-
seise the rightful owner. In order to facilitate matters, some legislatures
have decreased the time required but at the same time have added other
requirements that were not found at common law, such as, the payment
of taxes, color of title, and in the case of fencing in, have varied the term
in order to have a good title.
Edward F. Grogan, Jr.
DEDICATION - ACCEPTANCE REQUIRED TO IMPOSE LIABILITY UPON
THE PUBLIC.-Dedication is a means of exchange of land unique in
the modern law; it is one of the few modes of conveyance not bound
by the writings and other formalities of present real estate law. Simply,
a dedication is a setting apart of land for the public use.' AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE defines it more fully as "an appropriation of realty by
the owner to the use of the public and the adoption thereof by the pub-
lic having respect to the possession of the land and not the permanent
estate, express when explicity made by oral dedication, deed, or note,
implied when there is an acquiescence in a public use, and applying in
this country not only to highways, but to public squares, commons,
burying grounds, school lots, lots for church purposes, and pious and
charitable uses generally." 2
CoRPuS JuRis 3 traces the origin of this type of transfer back to the
early English case of Lade v. Shepherd,4 which seems to be the first
case to use the word "dedication," although the method was known
sometime earlier, at which time this right of the public was said to
arise "from custom," and not "dedication."
There are generally considered to be two kinds of dedication: com-
mon law, and statutory; the chief distinction being that the statutory
dedication operates as a grant, while the common law dedication oper-
ates by way of estoppel in pais. 5 An Illinois case, Ryerson v. Chicago,"
distinguishes the two as follows: the right conferred by the common
law dedication is an easement only, while in most jurisdictions a stat-
1 Gore v. Blanchard, 96 Vt. 234, 118 At. 888 (1890).
2 16 Aw. Jua. 348.
3 c. J. 39.
4 Str. 1004, 93 Reprint 997 (1732).
5 Poindexter v. Schaffner, 162 S. W. 22 (Texas 1914). Contra: TrANY,
REAL PROPERTY, 1885.
6 247 III. 185, 93 N. E. 162 (1910).
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utory dedication vests the fee of the property in the municipality to
which the dedication was made. This note shall not consider statutory
dedication, but shall pry into the amount of acceptance required to
render the public liable for care and upkeep of the dedicated prop-
erty, and since this acceptance i' generally provided for by the statute
involved, the result is that there is no real question regarding statutory
dedication. Generally a statutory dedication is created .by a particular
form of instrument, usually recorded; there must be a substantial com-
pliance with the provisions of the statute. Such dedication operates
by way of grant, and the necessity of acceptance by the public is dis-
pensed with. 7
Since the discussion is confined to common law dedication, it might
be well to consider the requirements for such a dedication and the na-
ture of the interest the public acquires thereby. Quite simply, com-
mon law dedication requires an intention of the dedicator to dedicate,
and an acceptance of the dedication by the public. "To constitute
common law dedication there must be an intention by the proprietor
of land to dedicate it to the public, and there must be an acceptance
by the public and proof of such facts must be clear, satisfactory, and
unequivocal." 8 A general essential to its validity is that it prevent
the owner from retracting his dedication."
Generally a common law dedication of property does not affect the
ownership thereof, but merely gives the public a right of user therein.10
A Texas case reaches a unique view in holding the city a trustee of the
property for the public. "Where property is appropriated to a public
use by common-law dedication, the municipality within the borders of
which the premises are a part takes the property as trustee for the pub-
lic, for the special use designated by the dedicator." 11 For a some-
what similar view see a Maryland case, North Beach v. North Chesa-
peake Beach Land & Improvement Co. of Calvert County.12 On fhe"
other hand, a recent California case 13 held that once the dedication
of land was complete for street purposes the property became the pub-
lic's property and the owner'lost all control over it, or special right to
its use. In some states the view has been taken, that in case of land
dedicated for a park or commons, or even for a highway, the munic-
ipality which controls the land so dedicated to the public has a suffi-
7 MrcH. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 3936. Olsen v. Village of Grand Beach, 282
Mich. 364, 276 N. W. 481 (1938).
8 City of St. Petersburg v. Meloche 110 So. 341 (Fla. 1926).
9 Woas AND PHRASFS (First Series, 1909).
10 TIuTMxy, Rr. . PROPERTY, 1886.
11 City of Fort Worth v. Burnett 114 S. W. (2d) 220 (Texas 1938).
12 191 AtI. 71 (Md. 1937).
13 Brick v. Cazaux, 64 Pac. (2d) 155 (1937).
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cient right of possession to enable it to maintain an ejectment suit
against an intruder. 14
We have already seen that the essential requirements for a common
law dedication are an intention to dedicate and an acceptance. The
problem we face is: Just what amount of acceptance is required to
complete the dedication, and what will be the varying results of dif-
ferent kinds of acceptance? The law is inconsistent in many cases
in holding that a much greater degree of acceptance is required to bind
the public to liability for the care and upkeep of the dedicated land
than merely to preclude the owner from retracting his dedication. The
somewhat unjust result is reached whereby the public frequently bene-
fits; but cannot be bound - the unique situation of a right without a
duty, something generally unheard of in the field of law. CoRPus JURIs
presents the problem excellently, "There is oonsiderable conflict as to
whether user by the public will, in addition to binding the dedicator
and consummating the dedication, bind the municipality so that it will
be responsible for the maintenance and repair of the property for the
purposes for which it was dedicated. The probable weight of authority
is that liability cannot be fastened upon the municipality; this is obvi-
ously so where statutes require acceptance by a municipal council." 15
The whole problem finally narrows down to whether public user is
sufficient acceptance of a dedication, to bind the public, or whether a
formal acceptance is required. It is generally conceded that mere use
by the public - not necessarily for the statutory period of limitations
-is sufficient to consummate the dedication for most purposes. 1 The
jurisdictions, however, are definitely divided as to whether it is suf-
ficient to bind the municipality to maintenance of the dedicated prop-
erty, and before any attempt at reconciliation or comment can be made,
it seems prudent to present the cases accepting the prevailing conflict-
ing views.
14 TirAxy, REAL PROPERTY, 1886.
15 18 C. j. 79.
16 Stewart v. Conley, 122 Ala. 179, 27 So. 303 (1889); Hall v. Kauffman,
106 Cal. 451, 39 Pac. 756 (1895); City of Denver v. Denver & S. F. Ry., 17 Colo.
583, 31 Pac. 338 (1892); Phillips v. City of Stamford, 81 Conn. 408, 71 Atl. 361,
22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1114 (1908); Parsons v. Trustees of Ala. U., 44 Ga. 529 (1871):
Consumers Co. v. Chicago, 268 Ill. 113, 108 N. E. 1017 (1915);- Raymond v.
Wichita, 70 Kan. 523, 79 Pac. 323 (1905); Riley v. Buchanan, 116 Ky. 625, 76
S. W. 527, 63 L. R. A. 642 (1903); Cushwa v. Williamsport, 117 Md. 306, 84 Atl.
389 (1912); Attorney-General v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 28 N. E. 346, 13 L. R. A.
251 (1891); Minium v. Solel, 183 S. W. 1037 (Mo. 1916); Cassidy v. Sullivan, 75
Neb. 847, 106 N. W. 1027 (1906); Schmidt v. Spaeth, 82 N. J. L. 575, 83 Atl. 242
(1912); Montgomery v. Somers, 50 Ore. 259, 90 Pac. 674 (1907); Watertown v.
Troeth, 25 S. D. 21, 125 N. W. 501 (1910); Morris v. Bhent, 49 Utah 243, 161
Pac. 1127 (1916); Seattle v. Hinckley, 67 XVash. 273, 121 Pac. 444 (1912).
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The weight in numbers seems to be with those courts demanding a
formal acceptance before holding the public liable. The Maine court
so held in Mayberry v. Standish,'7 in State v. Wilson,'8 and in State v.
Bradbury,' where the court went so far as to declare that the repair-
ing of a dedicated highway by the state surveyor of highways did not
constitute sufficient acceptance to bind the state for injuries resulting
from defects in maintenance. However, compare the dictum in an-
other Maine case, Bartlett v. Bangor 20 to the effect that public user
would be sufficient to bind the public if it continued over the prescrip-
tive period. An old. Maryland case, Ogle v. City of Cumberland 21 is
one of the best known cases for this view and the opinion states the
rule excellently, "There can be no question that the facts of the case
establish a dedication to the public's use by the railroad of the road,
upon which the appellant was injured. As between the owner of the
land covered by the road and the public, the latter was entitled to use
it as a highway; but that did not, of itself, impose upon the city the
obligation to keep the road in repair, nor make it liable for accidents
resulting from the defective condition of the road. Before the appellee
(the city) can be held liable for the injury for which the present suit
was instituted, it must appear that there had been an acceptance by it,
through the acts of its authorized public departments or officials, of the
road on which the accident happened, as one of the public streets."
The fact that the city had placed a street light there, and had provided
for fire protection was not considered a sufficient acceptance.22 Illinois
is in accord with this holding,23 as is Connecticut,2 4 California, 25 Geor-
gia,20 Michigan, 27 Ohio, -  West Virginia,2:' Texas,30 and Wyoming.3 1
17 56 Me. 242 (1868).
18 42 Me. 9 (1856).
19 40 Me. 154 (1855).
20 67 Me. 460 (1878).
21 90 Md. 59, 44 Atl. 1015 (1899).
22 See also: Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153, 37 Atl. 648 (1897); State
v. Kent County, 83 Md. 377, 35 Atl. 62 (1896); Commissioners of Baltimore
County v. Collins, 158 Md. 335, 148 Atl 242 (1930); MDo. ACTS. 1920, c. 597.
23 Beebe v. Menard County Road District No. 1, 134 Ill. App. 583 (1907);
Krisch v. City'of Chicago, 150 Ill. App. 197 (1909); Forbes v. Balenseifen, 74 111.
183 (1874); Willey v. People, 36 Ill. App. 609 (1889).
24 Town of Stratford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 106 Conn. 34, 137 Atl. 13
(1927).
25 See Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489 (1868).
26 Penick v. Morgan Co., 131 Ga. 385, 62 S. E. 300 (1809).
27 Chapman v. Sault Ste. Marie, 146 Mich. 23, 109 N. W. 53 (1906); Irving
v. Ford, 65 Mich. 241, 32 N. W. 601 (1887). Also Olsen v. Village, supra note 7.
28 Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 431, 8 L. Ed. 452 (1832); Cincinnati
Ry. Co. v. Roseville, 760 Ohio St. 108, 81 N. E. 178 (1907).
29 Hast v. Piedmont R. Co., 52 W.-Va. 396, 44 S. E. 15 (1903); Michaelson
v. City of Charlestown, 71 W. Va. 35, 75 S. E. 151 (1912).
80 Poindexter v. Schaffner, 162 S. W. 22 (Texas Civ. App. 1914).
81 Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 24 Wyo. 416, 171 Pac. 267 (1918),
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A Kentucky court held that a city was not liable for the condition of
the street which it had not taken control of or accepted, though it had
been used by owners of houses facing on it, and by persons going to
and from these houses for years.3 ' In the decision in Johnson v. City
of Niagara Falls 33 a New York Court held that the fact that a portion
of the public had travelled over the road in question for twenty years
would not make it a highway so as to compel the city to repair it, it
being necessary that in addition to user as a highway there be some
adoption by public authority. A Vermont court demanded other ac-
ceptance than extensive use: such acts of public recognition as putting
the road in rate bills of the highway surveyor, expending money there-
on, shutting up the old road, and leaving no other avenue of travel,
34
while a Virginia court decided that acceptance must be of record, as
by laying off highways into precincts, or by appointing surveyors or
overseers. , 5  The New Jersey court in Schoenberg v. O'Connor ~" said
that although the municipality must accept a street dedication by prop-
erty owners by formal adoption before it can be forced to repair, ac-
ceptance is not essential to consummation of the dedication so as to cut
off the owner from the power of recission or subject the lands to public
use whenever the wants of the public require a street for that purpose.
The Massachusetts court held that a road laid out by a park partly
across private land was not a road so as to make the city liable for in-
jury caused by defects, even though the road was of such an appear-
ance as, to lead a reasonable traveler to suppose it was a public high-
way and not a parkway.3 7 However this is not surprising in the face
of an early Massachusetts statute 11 which changed the common law
rule so as to prevent the creation of a highway by dedication. A Cana-
dian court in Quebec 31' held that the fact that a municipal corporation
had laid drains in a private lane within the city limits was not suffi-
cient acceptance to make it a city street so as to impose responsibility
for injuries to a person falling thereon.
Missouri seems to be a jurisdiction that is somewhat bewildered as
to just which rule to adopt, and a perusal of the cases would indicate
32 Raines v. East Tenn. Telephone Co., 150 Ky. 670, 150 S. W. 830 (1912).
Cf. Mulligan v. McGregor, 165 Ky. 222, 176 S. W. 1129 (1915); Schuster v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 24 Ky. L. 2346, 74 S. W. 226 (1903).
33 230 N. Y. 77, 129 N. E. 213 (1920). Accord: Kiepper v. Seymour House
Corp. of Ogdensburg, 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29, 62 A. L. R. 955 (1927).
34 Tower v. Rutland, 56 Vt. 28 (1884); Page v. Weathersfield, 13 Vt. 424
(1841); Bacon v. Boston Ry. Co., 83 Vt. 421, 76 AtI. 128 (1910).
85 Commissioners v. Kelly, 8 Gratt. (49 Va.) 632 (1851).
86 14 N. J. Misc. 412, 185 Atl. 377 (1936), aff'd 166 N. J. L. 398, 185 AtI.
382 (1936).
87 Jones v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 267, 87 N. E. 589 (1909).
38 MASS STAT. 1846, c. 203 § 1.
39 Tongas v. Montreal, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 12 Can. S. 532.
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that judges have .generally tended to adopt the view that at the mo-
ment appears more equitable. Dounend v. Kansas City 40 comes out
quite unequivocally in favor of the majority rule of formal acceptance
and holds that approval of the plat of a proposed addition to a city
by the common council does not constitute an acceptance of the streets
therein laid out so as to bind the city for repair, although such plat
does vest the fee in the streets therein described. The method of ac-
ceptance did not sufficiently meet the city charter's demands. Seem-
ingly in accord with this strict rule is another Missouri court which
went so far as to say that the establishment of a street cannot be proven
by parol; that it is a matter only of the record. 4 1 However this is
not a popular view and the universal authority is to the contrary, that
no writing be necessary for such a dedication. 42 A glance at Downend
v. City of Kansas City 4a would seem to settle the law unless one went
further and discovered that in many Missouri cases, the courts have
decided otherwise - that where a street of a city, whether formally
accepted or not, had been used by the public as a public streef for ten
years and generally recognized as such, the street became a public street
so as to render the city liable for injuries to a traveler caused by de-
fects therein. 44  It is interesting to note that these latter cases are
subsequent in time, and probably reflect the trend as evidenced in this
jurisdiction.
And then there is the line of cases which hold that mere public user
is sufficient acceptance of dedicated property to impose liability upon
the public for the maintenance and upkeep.thereof. These cases place
the dedicatee in no better position than the dedicator - a position
obviously fair. In England, in the early days of the common law, the
courts required no adoption of a dedicated road by public authority to
bind the public to repair the roads, 4 - and even when the British Par-
liament changed this rule by statute the courts decided that the statute
had no application to roads already dedicated. 46, Kansas would seem
to be in line with the early English rule, one court holding that a city
by conveyance of a part of a dedicated public levee cannot divest it-
self of its public municipal duty to control the property for the pub-
40 156 Mo. 60, 56 S. W. 902, 51 L. R. A. 300 (1900).
41 Beaudeau v. Cape Girardeau, 71 Mo. 393 (1880).
42 Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 118 S. W. 418 (1909); Winchester v.
Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40 S. E. 37 (1901).
43 156 Mo. 60, 56 S. W. 902, 51 L. R. A. 300 (1900).
44 Hemphill v. City of Morehouse, 162 Mo. App. 566, 142 S. W. 817 (1912);
Accord: Benton v. St. Louis, 217 Mo. 687, 118 S. W. 418 (1909); Scheffler v.
City of Hardin, 140 Mo. App. 13, 124 S. W. 569 (1910); Ballew v. City of St.
Joseph, 163 Mo. App. 297, 146 S. W. 454 (1912); Twedell v. City of St. Joseph,
167 Mo. App. 547, 152 S. W. 432 (1912).
45 Rex v. Leake, 5 B. & Ald. 469, 27 ECL. 201, 110 Reprint 86.
46 Reg. v. Westmark, 2 M. & Rob. 305.
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lic good. 47 This case is not strictly in point, but it implies an ad-
herence to the rule. A North Carolina court ruled that if the authori-
ties of a city have treated a place as a public street, taking charge of
it and regulating it as they do other streets, and a person is injured in
consequence of the negligent manner in which the city maintains it,
the city, when sued for such injury, cannot question the regularity of
the proceedings by which the place became a street or the authority
by which it was originally established.48 A neighbor state, South Caro-
lina, reached the same result in Caston v. City of Rock Hill 49 where a
lot holder had set his fence back and thereby dedicated a space for a
sidewalk which was accepted by user. The law cast upon the city the
duty to keep that space in reasonably safe condition for use. An Idaho
court held that public use for five years was sufficient acceptance to
impose liability upon the city.-" Pennsylvania, from the very begin-
ning, has seemed to adhere to this rule, and in a recent case of Calhoon
v. Pittsburgh Coal Co.,r5 the court decided that constant use by the
public of a roadway, leading to a ferry, was sufficient to bind the
borough for repairs and damages resulting from defects thereon, since
no formal acceptance is necessary to make a dedicated roadway a pub-
lic highway; this is the law in that state as evidenced by earlier cases.
5 2
The fact that a city had expended money in repair of a bridge and as-
sumed exercised control and supervision over it, was held by a Minne-
sota court,5 3 to be sufficient acceptance, even in the absence of action by
the city council on the matter; and a Wisconsin court 54 said that "mere
user was the highest form of acceptance." In Tennessee it was decided
where two boys were drowned in an old quarry along which the street
in question ran, that the mere putting of a fire plug along this dedicat-
ed street was sufficient acceptance by the city so as to demand its keep-
ing the way beside the road safe for the traveling public. 5 The judge
intimated, however, that he so decided, because the quarry amounted
to an attractive nuisance.5 ' Despite an opposing rule in Connecticut,
7
47 Board of Commissioners of Douglas County v. City of Lawrence, 102 Kan.
656, 171 Pac. 610 (1918).
48 Gilbreath v. City of Greensboro, 153 N. C. 396, 69 S. E. 268 (1910).
49 107 S. C. 124, 92 S. E. 191 (1917).
50 Gallup v. Bliss, 44 Idaho 756. 262 Pac. 154 (1927); IDAHO COMP. STAT.;
§ 1304, 3977.
51 128 Pa. Super. 582, 194 Atl. 768 (1937).
52 Probst v. Williamsport, 227 Pa. 596, 76 Atl. 422 (1910); Ackerman v.
Williamsport, 227 Pa. 591, 76 Atl. 421 (1910).
53 Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308 (1871); Accord: Kennedy v. Le Van,
23 Minn. 513 (1877) ; Phelps v. Mankatoo, 23 Minn. 276 (1877).
54 Buchanan v. Curtis, 25 Wis. 99, 3 Am. Rep. 23 (1869).
55 Doyle v. City of Chattanooga,. 128 Tenn. 433, 161 S. W. 997, Ann. Cas.
1915C, 283 (1915).
56 Attorney General v. Abbott, 154 Mass. 323, 28 N. E. 346 (1891).
57 Green v. Canaan, 29 Conn. 157 (1860).
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that jurisdiction in Phelps v. City of Stamford 5s said that cases of
public user being sufficient acceptance were to be limited to those high-
ways of common convenience and necessity, which are therefore a bene-
fit to the public and not a burden. This seems to be an effort to effect
a compromise between the two rules. Other jurisdictions which hold
that formal acceptance is not necessary are Indiana,-'- New Hamp-
shire,6 1° Iowa."' Alabama, 'P - and Washington. ,:"
It can be seen from a review of the cases cited that there is a definite
split of authority, but it seems that the latter view is more equitable.
In the Iowa case of Manderschid v. City of Dubztque,6 4 Justice Beck
says, "Now it appears to be unreasonable, and contrary to the plainest
principles of justice, that acceptance may be thus proved and inferred
against the land owner, or those who are charged with. the violation of
the law by obstructing a public way, and yet that the same evidence
will be insufficient to prove the like fact when the public authorities
are charged with neglect of duty or violation of law touching the high-
way, whereby the private citizen suffers loss. This would be establish-
ing one kind of law for the citizen, and another for municipalities and
other quasi corporations and public officers .... ." This indictment
seems to be a just one. It really seems as if the city were "having its
cake and eating it too." The law on dedication has gone so far as to
hold that even though highways had not been adopted as such by pub-
lic authority, and no responsibility was thus shifted to the municipality.
mere use constitutes sufficient acceptance to authorize the public to
entertain criminal proceedings against persons obstructing the road so
dedicated, 65 or suits to enjoin such obstruction.r,
Many courts do not adhere to the harsher rule, as has been seen.
And there are a few states which, although requiring formal acceptance.
also require such acceptance for other purposes.6 7 Thus in these states
where public user is not sufficient acceptance for any purpose the equal-
58 81 Conn. 408, 71 Atl. 361 (1908).
59 Hammond v. Maher, 30 Ind. App. 286, 65 N. E. 1055 (1903); Sell v. State
125 N. E. 402 (Ind. 1919); City of Michigan City v. Szczepanek, 85 Iid. App.
227, 150 N. E. 374 (1926).
60 Willy v. Portsmouth, 35 N. H. 303 (1857).
61 Manderschid v. Dubuque, 29 Iowa 73, 4 Ann. Rep. 196 (1870); Dunn v.
Oelwein (Iowa, 1908), 118 N. W. 764.
62 Mobile v. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468 (1906).
63 Spencer v. Arlington, 49 Wash. 121, 94 Pac. 904 (1908).
64 29 Iowa 73, 4 Ann. Rep. 196 (1906).
65 State v. Birmingham, 74 Iowa 407, 38 N. W. 121 (1888); Summers v. State,
51 Ind. 201 (1875); Commissioners v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 12 Atl. 424 (1888).
66 Mobile v. Fowler, 147 Ala. 403, 41 So. 468 (1906).
67 Palmer v. Palmer, 50 N. Y. 139, 55 Am. St. Rep. 653, 44 N. E. 966; Smith
v. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 457, 90 N. E. 1121, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 524 (1910); Cin-
cinnati & M. V. R. Co. v. Roseville, 76 Ohio St. 108, 81 N. E. 178 (1907); Lynch-
ville Traction & Light Co. v. Guill, 107 Va. 86, 57 S. E. 644 (1907).
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ity between the dedicator and the public is reached just as in those
states where the user is sufficient to impose liability upon the public,
but by different means. A New York case, Rockford v. State,68 held
that mere public user was not sufficient acceptance so as to pass title
to the dedicated land to the public; and another recent case from the
same jurisdiction aimed at justice to the dedicator when it said, "Gen-
erally, where convincing proof is lacking of dedication, acceptance, and
general public use, courts look unkindly on the efforts of those having
in mind some mercenary or other unworthy purpose, rather than the
genuine convenience of the public in attempting to establish a mere
private way as a public way, and such efforts would work injustice." 69
After all, this matter of acceptance is largely a matter that should
depend on the facts of the case as to the intention of the parties in-
volved. If the public intended accepting the land in question for all
purposes as its own, I believe it should be held to have accepted it,
so as to impose upon it the same responsibility it has in connection
with streets and highways owned by the people Certainly the rule
should be modified in some circumstances so that the municipality does
not maintain unfair advantage over the dedicator.
Leon L. Lancaster, Jr.
EXTRA-LATERAL RIGHTS IN MINING.-"He who owns the surface
owns below to the center of the earth, and above to the sky." This
is the well known common law principle which gives to the possessor
of the surface of the land only those ore bodies which are directly
beneath such surface. Strict application of this rule is also found
in the continental civil law sovereignties which confine the locator
of an ore body, vein, or lode to perpendicular lines on every side.'
Despite this age old maxim there exists in some parts of our system of
mining jurisprudence an apparent departure therefrom which allows
the locator of a surface claim containing minerals to pursue an ore
bearing body, lode, vein, or ledge which apexes or commences within such
claim, on its downward course or dip, to its ultimate depth even
though such vein or ledge should, underground, so far depart from
the perpendicular as to enter the land adjoining. 2
68 274 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1934).
69 People Ex. Rel. Minard v. Donovan, 240 N. Y. Supp. 766, 770, 228 App.
Div. 596 (1930).
1 See Flagstaff Silver M. Co. v. Tarbet, 08 U. S. 463, 468, 25 L. Ed. 253
(1878).
2 Tom Reed Gold M. Co. v. United Eastern M. Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac.
283 (1922); Rico-Argentine M. Co. v. Rico-Cons. M. Co., 74 Colo. 444, 223 Pac.
31 (1924); Iron Silver M, Co. v. Cheesman, 8 Fed. 297 (1881).
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The origin of this doctrine of Extra-Lateral Rights, as it is called,
though surrounded by much doubt, is believed by some to have sprung
from the early rule of mining jurisprudence which once obtained in Ger-
many and was, it is claimed, abandoned because of the endless litigation
it entailed; 3 by others it is said to have its foundation in the practice of
miners in Derbyshire, England. It appeared first in this country soon
after the famous gold rush of '49, in California, embedded in the mining
regulations, which gave to the discoverer of a vein possessory rights to
the "dips, spurs and angles, off-shoots, depths, variations, widths, and all
mineral and other valuables therein contained." 4
Before proceeding farther with this discussion it is elemental that
a few expressions peculiar to the field of mining law be defined. Though
the terms "location" and "mining claim" are used interchangeably in
mining parlance, and for most ordinary purposes may be considered
synonymous, strictly speaking, a "location" is the act or series of acts
of appropriation of a parcel of land, in accordance with the regulations
of the mining act, which parcel of land contains precious metals in its
soil or rock; while a mining claim designates the land appropriated, 5
and may include a series of adjoining locations. The formal require-
ments, or the acts of appropriation, necessary to constitute a valid loca-
tion are:-l. Discovery of minerals; 6 2. Placing upon such land ap-
propriated a notice of discovery; 7 3. Sinking a discovery shaft, or
its statutory equivalent, which exposes to view the vein discovered; s
4. Marking the location plainly on the surface so that its boundaries
may be readily traced; 9 and 5. Recording a notice of discovery at the
office of the county recorder or other place provided by statute.10 The
area of a location under the modern federal mining law is limited to
fifteen hundred feet of length along the course of the vein discovered,
and to three hundred feet feet of width on each side of such vein at the
surface.'1 One may, however, locate a smaller area than the amount
permitted and still remain within the statute.' 2 The location is limited
3 KLOSTERmAN, TREATsa RussiAN MImNo LAW (1870) § 81; Anaconda Cop.
M. Co. v. Pilot Butte M. Co., 52 Mont. 165, 176, 156 Pac. 409 (1016).
4 J. Ross BROWNE, MoEp.%L REsoURC.S (1867) p. 247.
5 St. Louis Sin. and Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 648, 649, 26 L..Ed.
313 (1881); Creede & Cripple Creek M. & M. Co. v. Uinta M. & Trans. Co., 196
U. S. 337, 342. 25 Sup. Ct. 266 (1905).
6 REV. STAT. U. S. § 2320; Kramer v. U. S. Machine Co., 76 P. (2d) 540
(Calif. 1938).
7 Required generally by custom and, in a few states, by statute.
8 Required by statutes and local mining regulations, and usually must be at
least ten feet deep.
9 REa. SA.n. U. S. § 2320. Gleson v. Martin White M. Co., 13 Nev. 442,
456, 35 Pac. St. Rep. 894 (1878),
10 Governed by state statutes.
11 Rav. STAT. U. S. § 2320.
12 Schlageter v. Cutting, 116 Cal. App. 489, 2 P. (2d) 875 (1931).
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to the same number of feet along the vein beneath the surface as it has
at the apex,1" but extra-lateral rights may be asserted under either or
both side lines.14 The end lines of a location as contemplated by the
statute are the three hundred feet lines crossing the course of the vein at
the extremities of such location, while the side lines are the fifteen hun-
dred feet lines which run lengthwise along the course of the vein. The
foregoing definitions of end and side lines, however, are not conclusive
in determining the rights of an imperfect location, for in such case, as
will be shown later, the end lines are held to be those which are cross
wise to the general course of the vein at the surface, although they may
have been located as side lines.' "
What constitutes a "vein," "lode,". "ledge," or "lead" is of difficult
definition, and can be properly determined only when the specific ques-
tion requiring such arises. "Vein" or "lode" is the wording most com-
monly used in statutes, the word "ledge" is usually interchangeable, and
the word "lead," used in mining districts, is synonymous. The words
employed by Congress to convey the meaning are "mining claims upon
veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold, silver,
cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits." 16 Geologically a
vein is a fissure, produced by some strain on the earths' crust, filled with
mineral matter, or, more accurately aggregations of mineral matter con-
taining ore in fissures. 17 This mineral matter is enclosed between more
or less well defined walls, usually is inclined at some varying degree
from the perpendicular or horizontal, and usually is irregular and un-
dulating. The miners' definition, and that which is contemplated by
statute, is that a vein is a formation in the earth's crust by which the
miner can be led or guided with th& reasonable expectancy of finding
in such formation, ore or minerals in paying quantities.' 8 In the lead-
ing case Iron Silver Mining Company v. Cheesman 19 it was said that
a body of mineral or mineral bearing rock in the general mass of the
mountain, so far as it may continue unbroken and without interruption,
may be regarded as a lode, whatever the boundaries may be. These
definitions, at best, are vague and of uncertain comprehension, but for
the purposes of this article a vein, lode, ledge, or lead may be visualized
as any plane or stratum of ore bearing rock, distinguishable from the
13 Anaconda Cop. M. Co. v. Pilot Butte M. Co., 52 Mont. 165, 156 Pac. 409
(1916).
14 Jim Butler Tonopah M. Co. v. West End Cons. M. Co.. 247 U. S. 450.
o2 L. Ed. 1207. aff'd, 30 Nev. 375, 158 Pac. 876 (191S).
15 North Post Sm. & M. Co. v. Lone Pine Surprise Cons. M. Co., 271 Fed.
105, aff'd 278 Fed. 719 (1922).
16 REv. STAT. U. S. § 2320.
17 See Hayes v. Lavagino, 17 Utah 185, 194, 53 Pac. 1029 (1898).
1 See King v. Amy Cons. M. Co., 0 Mont. 543, 545, 24 Pac. 200 (1890).
19 8 Fed. 297, 301 (1881).
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surrounding mass of rock, of varying thickness, and which extends
downward into the earth and lengthwise along the surface of the earth
indefinitely.
To bring a vein or lode within the statute it must be a vein or lode
of "rock in place." A vein or lode "in place" is a vein or lode found
in its original state or condition, in fixed and immovable rock, in the
general mass of the mountain. 20 In discussing the necessity of rock
in place in Tabor v. Dexter,21 Judge Hallett stated that whether the ore
is loose and friable, or very hard, if the enclosing walls are country
rock, it may be located as a lode. But if the ore is on top of the
ground, or has no covering other than the superficial deposit it is not
a lode or vein within the meaning of the statute.
Extra-lateral rights are dependent upon the apexing of the vein claim-
ed within the surface lines of the locator's claim.2 2 Therefore, it is of
primary importance to determine the nature of the apex of a vein. Here
again the courts receive little or no assistance from the lexicographers.
The apex or top of a vein has been defined as the highest point of the
vein whether at the surface of the ground or at any point below the sur-
face,2 8 but this is often misleading as the highest point of a vein may
be a spur, feeder, or offshoot. A good definition is that the apex of a
vein is all of that portion of the terminal edge of such vein from which
it extends downward in the direction of the dip and is the point from
which the vein has a dip as well as a strike.24 But it has been held
that a terminal edge is not essential, and that the crest of an anti-clinal
roll, or the crest of a vein in the form of a single anti-clinal fold is its
apex.25  Another commendable interpretation of this difficult term -
and, perhaps, one more comprehensive - is that the apex is the upper-
most edge or course of the vein, in place, at or near the surface of the
earth. This edge or apex is irregular, and may be higher at one place
than it is in another; but the mere elevation of this edge at different
points is of no moment.2 6  Thus, the true picture of the apex of a
vein is that it is the highest point thereof, along a more or less con-
20 MODERN A1MERICAN LAW, Vol. VI. p. 421.
21 Fed. Cas. No. 13.723 (187S).
22 Stewart M. Co. v. Ontario M. Co., 237 U. S. 350, 54 L. Ed. 989 (1915).
aff'd 23 Idaho 724, 132 Pac. 787 (1915). Alameda M. Co. v. Success M. Co.
29 Idaho 618, 161 Pac. 862 (1916).
23 Larkin v. Upton. 144 U. S. 1Q. 23. 36 L. Ed. 330 (1891); Stewart M. Co.
v. Ontario M. Co., 23 Idaho 724, 737: 132 Pat. 787, aff'd 237 U. S. 350. 59 L. Ed.
989 (1916).
24 L"NDLEY, MIxS (2nd Ed.), § 309. Alameda M. Co. v. Success M. Co..
29 Idaho 618, 161 Pac. 862 (1916).
25 Jim Butler Tonopah M. Co. v. West End Cons. M. Co. 39 Nev. 375.
158 Pac. 876 (1916).
26 58 Am. St. Rep. 272.
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tinuous edge, and not the top of a spur or feeder, just as the apex of
a house is the course along the top of the roof and not the top of a
chimney or a flagstaff.
"Course" or "strike" is a miners' term, and is defined as the longi-
tudinal direction of the vein across the surface of the earth,27 or its
continuous apex,28 no matter what angle the surface may have with ref-
erence to the horizontal. The statute does not mention the terms
"strike" or "course" but the words used to impart the meaning are
"along the vein or lode." 29 Where the vein is crooked, the apex there-
of is determined by a horizontal line drawn between the extremities of
the vein at that depth at which it attains its greatest longitudinal ex-
tent, 80 and not by ifs direction at any one point. In the final analysis
the words of the statute may be said to mean the length of that portion
of the vein which more nearly agrees with the surface of the earth.
The "dip" of the vein is its downward course as distinguished from
its strike, or onward course, and means the direction of an ore vein or
lode in its descent into the earth at right angles to the strike.81 A
similar definition is that the dip or downward course signifies the course
of the vein from the surface toward the center of the earth, whether in
a perpendicular course or at an angle.3 2
The extra-lateral right became a part of the positive law of the fed-
eral government by the enactment of the Law of 1866, 33 in sections
two and four, which followed, almost verbatim, the wording of the
earlier California mining regulations. As this act did not require par-
allelism of the end lines of a location - nor, indeed, any regularity
whatsoever of location lines - many mining claims of peculiar shapes
were filed and the courts found it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
at times, to equitably apply this doctrine. Consequently, in 1872, Con-
gress repealed the Law of 1866, and enacted the law as it stands today,
specifically requiring parallelism of the end lines of locations,3 4 and
granted that the "locators of all mining locations made on any mineral
vein, lode, or ledge situated on the public domain ... shall have the
exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all surface included with-
in the lines -of their location, and all veins, lodes, or ledges throughout
their entire depths, the top or apex of which lies inside such surface ex-
tended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may
27 See King v. Amy Cons. M. Co., 9 Mont. 543, 565, 24 Pac. 200 (1890).
28 COSTIGAN, MINING LAW (1908) § 36.
29 REV. STAT. U. S., § 2320.
30 Brugger v. Lee Yim 55 P. (2d) 564 (Calif. 1936).
31 Ibid.
32 Stewart M. Co. v. Ontario M. Co., 23 Idaho 724, 132 Pac. 787 (1915),
aff'd. 237 U. S. 350, 59 L. Ed. 989.
33 14 STAT. ch. 262. p. 251.
34 REV. STAT. U. S. § 2320.
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so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to ex-
tend outside the vertical side lines of such surface locations. But their
right of possession to such outside parts of such veins or ledges shall
be confined to such portion thereof as lie between vertical planes drawn
downward ... through the end lines of their location ... 3r
The rule laid down by this statute-applies only to the precious metal
bearing states of the west within what is popularly called the public
domain, which includes Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, parts of Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, Wyoming, and Utah. Within the original thirteen
states, the states carved out of them, and the state of Texas the United
States government has never owned land so, of course, there the federal
statute finds no application. A number of the remainder have been
expressly excepted from the operation of the mineral land acts,3 6 and
the rest have been released by operation of a general policy of reserva-
tion.3 7 In these states the common law rule of ownership applies strict-
ly, therefore, they have no problems of extra-lateral rights.
All of the states which fall within the provisions of the act have
passed legislation supplementing the federal law, and a few have ex-
pressly incorporated within their laws the extra-lateral right. 38 The
most notable of these state statutes, from which the rest are more or
less copied, is that of the state of Colorado which provides as follows:
"The location.., shall be construed to include all ground within the
surface lines thereof, and all lodes and ledges throughout their entire
depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such lines extended down-
ward, vertically, with such parts of all lodes or ledges as continue by dip
beyond the side lines of the claim, but shall not include any portion of
such lodes or ledges, beyond the end lines of the claim, or the end lines
continued, whether by dip or otherwise, or beyond the side lines in any
other manner than by dip of the lode." 39
The extent of this right in the land of another is, evidently, limited
to entrance of such land below the surface, and then only if the terms
of the statute have been meticulously complied with, for it must be kept
in mind that the owner of the surface has the prima facie right to all
beneath notwithstanding the extra-lateral right.40 A claimant must
35 REV. STAT. U. S. § 2322.
36 REV. STAT. U. S. § 2303 (Ala., Ark., Fla., La., & Miss.); REv. STAT. U. S.
§ 2345 (Mich., Wis., & Minn.); 1 Supp. R. S. U. S. p. 104 (Mo. & Kan.); U. S.
Com. STAT. (1901) (Part of Oklahoma)
37 Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, & Nebraska.
38 Colorado, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, & Wyoming.
39 CoLo. GE'L STATS. (1883) p. 723.
40 See Parrott Sil. M. Co. v. Heinze, 25 Mont. 139, 14S. 64 Pac. 326 (1901);
See Bourne v. Federal M. & Sm. Co.. 243 Fed. 466, 468 (1918).
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therefore, show a superior right.41  Again, should the claimant go
upon the surface of another's land for exploration, or any other pur-
pose whatsoever, without the permission of that other, he is as much a
trespasser as though the sub-surface right was non-existent. The nature
of this doctrine is to sever the mineral estate from an independent ad-
joining estate which is granted by permission of the positive law.
It must be further noted that the doctrine extends only to mineral
lands 42 as are contemplated by the statute. In the Law of 1866 such
minerals were enumerated as "gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper," 43 to
these in 1872 were added " . . . lead, tin, or other valuable deposits." 44
The determination of what constitutes "mineral lands" and "other
valuable deposits" is a function of the Land Department, and the courts
invariably await an adjudication by that body when such questions are
pending before them.45 The words have been held to include asphalt,
petroleum, borax, soda, sulphur, alum, kaolin, mica, marble, onyx, lime-
stone, gypsum, amber, clay, building stone and other stone of com-
mercial value, slate for roofing purposes, guano, and precious stones as
well as all metallic substances. Common brick, clay, cement, lime-
stone, sand, and gravel are not minerals according to the rulings of
the Land Department. Coal lands do not come within the mineral lands
statute as Congress has passed special laws governing their acquisi-
tion.46 But now let us examine the application of this unique rule.
The cases involving the extra-lateral right present questions of vary-
ing natures which may be enumerated as follows: 1. The perfect
location, i. e. where the end lines are cross wise to the general strike
of the vein; 2. Where the vein crosses the side lines rather than the
end lines; 3. Where the vein crosses one end line and one side line;
4. Veins crossing the same line twice; 5. Veins whose known apex
begins and ends within the same claim; 6. Non-parallel end lines
under the law of 1866; and 7. Instances where extra-lateral rights have
been denied or abridged.
The perfect location presents little or no problem since the rights of
such location are quite clear under the act to include all of the vein
as lies between parallel planes drawn on the end lines of the claim, and
the right to pursue the dip of all veins which apex in such claim be-
tween such parallel planes to their ultimate depth even though they
should depart from the perpendicular and so enter the land adjoining.
41 Consolidated Wyo. Gold M. Co. v. Champion M. Co., 63 Fed. 540 (1894).
Leadville M. Co. v. Fitzgerald, Fed. Cas. No. 8158 (1879): Mt. Diablo M. & M.
Co. v. Collison, Fed. Cas. No. 9886 (1879).
42 REV. STAT. U. S. § 2314.
43 14 STAT. ch. 262 § 2.
44 REv. STAT. U. S. § 2320.
45 See Ripinsky v. Hinchman, 181 Fed. 786. 704 (1910).
46 REv. STAT. § 2347, 2352.
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Nor has the second instance caused much trouble to the courts, for
where the vein or veins cross the side lines instead of the end lines the
courts have wisely held the side lines to become the end lines for
extra-lateral purposes.4 7 Any other rule would give the locator the
right to mine the strike of the vein, and this is clearly contrary to the
intent of the statute.48
The third problem presents one of more difficult solution. Due, per-
haps, to a miscalculation of the direction of his discovery vein the loca-
tor has drawn his location lines so that the vein intersects one of the
end lines and one of the side lines. This situation is not provided for
in the statute, therefore,-should the courts adopt a strict interpreta-
tion and apply the rule of construction that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed? This question has been
uniformly answered in the negative; the courts having elected an equi-
table solution which, though not within the letter of the law, is dearly
within its spirit and held that the end line crossed should remain the
end line for all purposes, the extra-lateral right extending between
parallel planes drawn along that end line and through that point along
the side line where the vein departs from the claim.4 9
There are very few cases directly deciding the question which arises
when a vein enters and departs through the same side line, in fact only
one directly in point has been uncovered. In that case 50 extra-lateral
rights were denied. This holding is apparently contrary to the general
application of the doctrine, for there can be no justifiable reason why
the aforementioned equitable construction should not obtain, and rights
granted by extending parallel planes parellel with the end lines, through
the points of intersection of the vein and the side line through which
it departs. CoRPus Juius cites the later case of Rico-Argentine Min-
ing Company v. Rico-Consolidated Mining Company 51 as overruling
the doctrine as applied in the Catron case; however, though the Rico
case does contain some dicta contrary to the Catron case, it decided
a problem wherein the vein crossed the side lines but once, and dearly
distinguished between the case which they were determining and the
47 Flagstaff Sil. M. Co. v. Tarbet, 98 U. S. 463, 25 L. Ed. 253 (1878); Tomb-
stone M. & M. Co. v. Way Up M. Co., 1 Ariz..426, 25 Pac. 794 (1883); Round
Mt. M..Co. v. Round Mt. Sphinx M. Co., 35 Nev. 392, 129 Pac. 308 (1913);
Silver King Coalition M. Co. v. Conkling -M. Co., 256 U. S. 18, 64 L. Ed. 811
(1920); North Port Sm. & M. Co. v. Lone Pine Surprise M. Co., 271 Fed. 105,
aff'd 278 Fed. 719 (1922).
48 Southern Nev. Gold & Sil. M. Co. v. Holmes M. Co., 27 Nev. 107, 73 Pac.
759. (1903).
40 Consolidated Wyo. M. Co. v. Champion M. Co., 63 Fed. 540 (1894); Del
Monte M. & M. Co. v. N. Y. & Last Chance M. Co., 66 Fed. 212 (1895); Clark
v. Fitzgerald 171 U. S. 92, 43 L. Ed. 87 (1897).
50 Catrort v. Old, 23 Colo. 433, 48 Pac. 687 (1897).
•t 74 Colo. 444, 223 Pac. 31 (1924).
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Catron case which was cited by attorneys for the plaintiff. It might
be said that the case, St. Louis Mining and Milling Company v. Mon-
tana Mining Company 52 overruled this narrow rule, but in that case
the vein entering and departing was merely an incidental or secondary
vein, there already being vested sub-surface rights by virtue of the dis-
covery vein which cut both end lines. But if extra-lateral rights can
be said to extend to an incidental vein it seems on, principle, that they
should also apply to any such irregular vein whether incidental or other-
wise.
The fifth type of question, that where the known apex of a vein
both begins and ends within the same location, presents an identical
question as that discussed immediately above, however, the authorities
are agreed that sub-surface rights attach to such vein,53 such rights be-
ing allowed between parallel planes parallel to the end lines through
such points where such vein commences and terminates.
The Law of 1886 did not require parallelism of the end lines of a
location, therefore, in connection with claims filed prior to 1872, prob-
lems are encountered wherein the vein crosses both end lines, but which
lines are not parallel. Queerly, the cases on this point have distin-
guished between end lines converging upon the dip and those diverging
therefrom. In the former, extra-lateral rights have been limited by ex-
tending planes along such converging end lines to the point of con-
vergence; 54 while in the latter, full rights have been allowed by draw-
ing parallel planes through the points where the vein enters into and
departs from the end lines bf the location. 55 This application of the
rule appears to be rather anomalous and without apparent reason, but
as it applies only to such irregular claims allowed before 1872, it does
not exert a great deal of influence on current mining; and it is quickly
disappearing due to the diminishing number of mines operating under
the Law of 1866.
In a few instances there arises conflicting claims to the same ore or
ore-bearing vein, lode, or ledge, as, for example, where two veins cross
or intersect on their dips, or veins which unite on their dip or strike
which necessitates the abriding of the extra-lateral rights of the one
or the other. The rule of seniority applies in such cases, and the pri-
mary right is given to the elder location. 56 However, in the former
52 104 Fed. 664 (1900).
53 Del Monte M. & M. Co. v. Last Chance M. Co., 171 U. S. 55, 43 L. Ed.
72 (1897); Consolidated Wyo. M. Co. v. Champion M. Co., 63 Fed. 540 (1894).
54 Carson City Gold & Sil. M. Co. v. North Star, 73 Fed. 597 (1896); Cen-
tral Eureka M. Co. v. East Central Eureka M. Co., 146 Calif. 147, 79 Pac. 834
(1905):
55 Argonaut M. Co. v. Kennedy M. Co., 131 Calif. 15, 63 Fac. 148 (1900).
56 REv. STAT. U. S. § 2336; Argentine M. Co. v. Terrible M. Co., 122 U. S.
478, 30 L. Ed. 1140 (1886); Rico-Argentine M. Co. v. Rico-Cons. M. Co., 74
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case - that of intersecting veins - the junior location has the right
to its vein beyond the point of intersection and is impliedly granted
an easement of necessity through such point for the purpose of proper
and convenient mining of the vein. 57
Situations also exist, of course, where sub-surface rights are denied
altogether. It is self-evident, as previously noted, that there are no
such rights in those states outside the scope of the federal law; and also
self-evident that the law finds no application to lands other than those
located and classified as mineral lands as defined by the statute and
the rulings of the Land Department. There are, however, cases falling
within the doctrine, where, nevertheless, the right has been denied.
Some courts have reached this result by a too strict adherence to the
common law principle,58 but these are in the extreme minority, and,
for the most part, have been overruled, at least by dicta, in later
cases. 59 A common example of a correct denial of extra-lateral rights
is where a vein has its apex in a valid mining claim, but on its dip it
enters land embraced by a previous government grant, in which the
right to penetrate has not been expressly reserved, viz. agricultural
grants, 60 and timber grants."1 It has also been held that no extra-
lateral rights exist to a vein beyond the point where in its downward
course outside the claim of apex, it becomes flattened and extends from
thence horizontally in a departure from the approximate general plane
of the dip of the vein, or for any considerable distance takes an up-
ward trend.62 One court has denied the right where the angle of dip
flattened to less than forty-five degrees.6 3 There have been judicial
pronouncements, however, at variance with the forty-five degree rule,
to the effect that there is nothing in the mining act that can possibly
justify the conclusion that extra-lateral rights attaching to a vein must
Colo. 444, 223 Pac. 31 (1924); Esselstyn v. U. S. Gold Corp., 59 Colo: 294, 149
Pac. 193 (1915); In Stinchfield v. Gillis, 96 Cal. 33, .30 Pac. 839 (1892), ore was
given to the grantee as against the grantor, on the ground that the vein inter-
section was below the granted land, although grantor's was the senior location.
5"? Rav. STAT. U. S. § 2336, Twenty-One M. Co. v. Original Sixteen To One
Mines, 255 Fed. 658 (1919).
58 Iron Sil. M. Co. v. Elgin M. Co., 118 U. S. 196, 30 L. Ed. 98 (1885);
Doe v. Sanger, 83 Calif. 203, 23 Pac. 365 (1890); Catron v. Old, 23 Colo. 433,
48 Pac. 687 (1897).
50 See St. Louis M. Co. v. Montana M. Co., 104 Fed. 664 (1900); see Rico-
Argentine M. Co. v. Rico-Cons. M. Co., 74 Colo. 444, 446, 223 Pac. 31 (1924).
60 Amador Medean Gold M. Co. v. South Spring Hill Gold M. Co., 36 Fed.
668, rev'd on other grounds 145 U. S. 300 (1888).
61 Reeves v. Oregon Exploration Co. 127 Ore. 686, 273 Pac. 389 (1929).
02 Tom Reed Gold M. Co. v. United Eastern M. Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac.
283 (1922).
63 Stewart M. Co. v. Ontario M. Co., 23 Idaho 724, 132 Pac. 787 aff'd. 237
U. S. 35o (1913).
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be limited to veins with a lesser dip than forty-five degrees or any
other variance from the true dip.64
Still another question frequently before the courts for solution is
that of secondary or incidental veins. There is no doubt that extra-
lateral rights attach to such veins if they are approximately parallel to
the original discovery vein and are within the same parallel planes
which measure the extra-lateral rights on such discovery vein.
65 How-
ever, when the discovery vein and the secondary vein do not have the
same extent and direction the problem becomes complex. There are
authorities which abridge extra-lateral rights beyond that segment of
the claim not covered by the vested rights of the discovery vein, but
the better opinion would seem, in view of the statute which gives to the
locator "all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the
top or apex of which lie in . . (the) surface lines extended downward
vertically . . .," 65G to be to allow full rights within the whole area of
the claim as if the secondary vein were a discovery vein.6 6 Where the
secondary vein cuts across the location at right angles to the discovery
vein the policy that there can be but one set of end lines for extra-
lateral purposes, and that there can be no right of pursuit along the
strike of a vein, necessarily compel a qualification of the above rule,
therefore, extra-lateral rights are denied on such vein.
67
As has been said before, the owner of the surface is prima facie the
owner of the sub-surface, therefore, a claimant to such sub-surface must
establish his superior right thereto.68 In establishing his superior right
the claimant must be able to identify the vein segment which lies be-
neath the land of another with the vein that apexes within his own lo-
cation. This identity does not depend upon a continuouq contact of
mineral deposits,6 9 slight interruptions of the mineral bearing rock does
not destroy the continuity of a vein 70 so long as it can be traced
through the surrounding rock 71 by vein matter deposits, mineralized
soil in the broken fissures, or by some other means. Nor does the fact
that a vein or ledge has step-faulted abridge the right of sub-lateral
64 Bunker Hill M. Co. v. Empire State M. Co., 134 Fed. 268 (1905).
65 Jefferson M. Co. v. Anchoria Leland M. Co., 32 Colo. 176, 75 Pac. 1070
(1904); Walrath v. Champion M. Co., 171 U. S. 293, 43 L. Ed. 170 (1897).
65t REV. STAT. U. S. § 2322.
66 Ajax Gold M. Co. v. Hilkey, 31 Colo. 131, 72 Pac. 447 (1903). Contra:
Jefferson M. Co. v. Anchoria Leland M. Co., 32 Colo. 176, 75 Pac. 1070 (1904).
67 Cosmopolitan M. Co. v. Foote, 101 Fed. 518 (1900).
68 See footnotes 40 and 41.
69 Utah Consolidated M. Co. v. Utah Apex Co., 285 Fed. 249, aff'd. 261 U. S.
617, 67 L. Ed. 829 (1922).
70 Buffalo Zinc Co. v. Crump, 70 Ark. 525, 69 S. W. 572 (1902).
71 Tom Reed Gold M. Co. v. United Eastern M. Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac.
283 (1922).
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pursuit.72 Finally it might be said that though courts will not. indulge
in mere speculations or conjectures, or permit mathematical projec-
tions,7 8 if a vein can be reasonably traced, geologically, from its apex
to the disputed segment the doctrine applies and full extra-lateral rights
attach.
There have been many attempts to get Congress to abolish the doc-
trine of extra-lateral rights and restore the common law rule to general
application; however, it is quite apparent that such a step would be
impractical, if not infeasible, in view of the numerous patented claims
which now have vested rights under the statute as it is at present. In
my opinion abolition of the right would not only increase difficult litiga-
tion, but would, as well, be extremely unjust to future locators. I dare
say that it cannot be doubted that the doctrine of extra-lateral pursuit
is but a rule of right. It is but pure natural justice to allow the dis-
coverer of an ore bearing vein to reap the full benefits of his discovery
by being allowed to pursue his vein to its ultimate depth no matter
where that depth should lead. It is my contention, therefore, that
rather than abolish this equitable doctrine, it should be universally
adopted, recognized, and applied.
Arthur J. Setna.
THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY NECESSARY TO MAKE A WILL IN
MICHIGAN.-Testamentary capacity pertains to the ability to execute a
will 1 and it is to be distinguished from "testamentary power." 2 It has
no relation to undue influence and its existence isn't dependent on free-
dom from undue influence, 3 for testamentary incapacity implies the
want of intelligent mental power,4 while undue influence presupposes
the existence of such power.
Section 13 478 of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides: "Every
person of full age and sound mind being seized in his own right of any
72 Original Sixteen to One Mines v. Twenty-one M. Co., 254 Fed. 630 (1918)
7.3 Collins v. Bailey, 22 Colo. App. 149, 125 Pac. 54-3, 548 (1912).
1 Mulford v. Central Farmers Trust Co., 99 Fla. 600, 126 So. 762 (1930):
Hamilton v. Morgan, 93 Fla. 311, 112 So. 80 (1927).
2 Mulford v. Central Farmers Trust Co., op. cit. supra, note 1. Where it was
held that, "Testamentary capacity as distinguished from testamentary power goes
to ability to execute a will, and what passes under it is controlled by law. Testa-
mentary power is the right a person has under the law to execute a will."
8 Hoff v. Hoff, 106 Kan. 542, 189 P. 613 (1920); Scott v. Townsend, 106
Tex. 322, 166 S. W. 1138, rev'd on other grounds, 159 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ App.
1914).
4 Scott v. Townsend, op. cit supra, note 3.
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lands or of any right thereto, or entitled to any interest therein de-
scendable to his heirs, may devise and dispose of the same by his last
will and testament in writing, and all such estate not disposed of by
will, shall descend as the estate of an intestate, being chargeable in
both cases with the payment of all his debts." For our purposes the
section covering bequests of personal property is substantially the
same, in that it requires a "sound mind." The problem at hand is to
determine the statutory construction or the meaning of the words
"sound mind" as construed by the Michigan courts.
The mental capacity necessary to enable a testator to make a valid
will, or the extent, or the degree of perfection to which he must attain
in understanding the will and the persons and property affected by it,
or the extent his mind must be impaired to render him incapable, is
a question of law exclusively for the court, and with which the wit-
nesses have no concern. It is a question of law of no little difficulty;
which calls for the highest skill of competent jurists, and upon which
the ablest courts are not entirely agreed. When the mental capacity
required to make a will is once determined, "existence or nonexistence
of sufficient mental capacity at the time the will was executed, is for
the jury under the instructions of the court - not for witness' opinion
regarding such facts. The jury, and not the witness is to draw the
conclusion from the facts stated by the witness." "
Since men do not make wills in the abstract, but some particular
will, the question should always relate to the capacity to understand
and make the will in controversy, 6 and should bear upon the time of
its execution. 7
The testator's condition at the time of making the will should be
compared with his condition at other times and not with that of other
persons.8 The reason for this holding is to simplify the investigation
by the jury, and give them some standard for measuring the capacity
of the testator at the time he made the will.
The rule, settled by the weight of authority, undoubtedly is, that
a lesser degree of mentality is requisite to the execution of a will than
a contract. However, this rule is not of very much help because it is
too broad and for that reason is not workable. It merely gives us an
idea of what is not necessary. In Fraser v. Jenninson 9 the court ex-
plains the mental capacity necessary, "Although the testator must un-
White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 159 (1862).
6 Kempsey v. McGinniss, 21 Mich. 123 (1870); Porter v. Throop, 47 Mich.
313, 11 N. W. 153 (1892).
7 Taft v. Hosmer, 14 Mich. 309 (1866).
8 Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482 (1870); Thayer v. Thayer, 188 Mich. 261,
154 N. W. 32 (1915); Burgess v. Joy, 191 Mich. 140, 157 N. W. 380 (1916).
9 42 Mich. 206, 3 N. W. 882 (1880).
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derstand substantially the nature of the act, the extent of his property,
his relations to others who may or ought to be the object of his bounty,
and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will, and must have
sufficiently active memory to collect in his mind, without prompting,
the elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in his
mind a sufficient length of time, perceive at least their obvious rela-
tions to one another, yet he need not have the same understanding
of these matters as a person in sound and vigorous health of body
and mind would have; nor is he required to know the precise legal ef-
fect of every provision contained in his will." "The will isn't valid
unless the person making it not only intends of his own free will to
make such a disposition, but has capacity to know what he is doing,
or understanding to whom he is giving his property, in what propor-
tions, and whom he is depriving of it as his heirs or devisees under
the will he makes. When a man has mind enough to know and ap-
preciate the natural object of his bounty, and the character and effect
of the disposition of the will, then he has a mind sufficiently sound
to enable him to make a valid will."
In order to make a valid contract a person must be capable of com-
prehending or understanding the subject of the contract and its nature
and probable consequences.10 The negative implication being, a gen-
eral comprehension of the subject matter of the contract and its con-
sequences would be insufficient, whereas a general knowledge as to the
nature and consequences of the act as implied from Fraser v. Jenni-
son 11 would be sufficient for a valid will. In Rice v. Rice 12 the tes-
tator had been determined judicially incompetent to manage his prop-
erty, but the court said, "that wasn't inconsistent with the capacity
to make a contract. If a party can make a contract and bargain with
another, he must certainly have authority to execute, as his own volun-
tary and spontaneous act a testamentary disposition of his property."
From this case it must be noted that a person determined incompetent
by the court, to manage his own property, may still make contracts
and since he has the capacity to execute a contract "he must certainly
have" the capacity to make a valid will. This holding is not incon-
10 Milks v. Milks, 129 Mich. 164, 88 N W. 402 (1901); Davis v. Phillips,
85 Mich. 198, 48 N. W. 513 (1891); West v. Russell, 48 Mich. 74, 11 N. W. 812
(1882) ; Fraser v. Hennison, op. cit. supra, note 9; Spratt v. Spratt, 76 Mich. 384,
4 N. W. 627 (1880); Aiken v. Weckerly, op. it. supra, note 8; Kempsey v. Mc-
Ginniss, op. cit. supra, note 6; Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich. 238 (1878); Pierce v.
Pierce, 38 Micli. 412 (1878); Rice v. Rice, 50 Mich. 448, 15 N. W. 545 (1883);
Hoban v. Pequette, 52 Mich. 346, 17 N. W. 797 (1884); White v. Bailey, 10
Mich. 155 (1862); Conely v. McDonald, 40 Mich. 150 (1879); Porter v. Throop,
op. cit. supra, note 6; Moriarity v. Moriarity, 108 Mich. 249, 65 N. W. 964 (1896)
In re Williams Estate, 185 Mich. 97. 151 N. W. 731 (1915).
11 Supra, note 10.
12 Supra, note 10.
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sistent with Hoban v. Piquette,13 which held, "There is no rule of law
which prescribes average capacity for a testamentary act."
From the cases cited, it is obvious that the performance of a one-
party act, such. as making a will, should require less strength of mind
than a transaction that requires bargaining with another person, such
as making a contract.
However, in all cases it doesn't necessarily follow that merely be-
cause the party is mentally competent to manage his property that
he has the mental capacity to make a valid will. In cases where the
person has insane delusions the testamentary disposition of property
may be affected, but not the conduct of ordinary financial and com-
mercial matters, which arise in the course of business. The will of
such an individual may be disallowed while his business transactions
are perfectly valid. The court said in the case of In re Merriarns Ap-
peal,14 "Delusion is a belief in a fact for which there is no founda-
tion." In Rivard v. Rivard 15 the counsel requested the court to charge
that Mr. Rivard was competent to attend to his business affairs, to
make deeds, leases, and contracts, and was therefore competent to
make wills, for the reason that it requires less capacity to make a will
than to execute deeds and contracts. The court said, "If the alleged
incompetency depended upon senile dementia or general insanity, coun-
sel's contention, under the instruction of the court as to his compe-
tency in this regard, would be correct, and the court should have so
directed the verdict. This rule is settled, not only by the authorities
in Michigan, but is recognized by courts generally . . . counsel ignores
the other well-settled rule, - that, while a man may be possessed of
such capacity, he still may be unable to execute the will in question,
on account of some delusion which has beclouded or taken away his
judgment in regard to th6se who are the natural objects of his bounty.
If a testator disinherits a daughter upon the belief that she is a bad
woman or that she is not his own offspring, or a son upon the belief
that he is a drunkard, or his grandchildren upon the belief that his
son-in-law has threatened to kill him, and it appears that there is no
foundation in fact for any such beliefs, and they are shown to be mere
delusions, a will disinheriting such children and grandchildren is void,
nothwithstanding he was entirely sane upon every other subject, and
fully competent to manage his own affairs." The court cited Fraser
v. Jennison,'6 wherein it was said, "A man may believe himself to be
the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and nevertheless make a perfectly
19 Supra, note 10
14 108 Mich. 454, 66 N. W. 372 (1896).
15 109 Mich. 98, 66 N. W. 681 (1896); Bush v. Delano, 113 Mich. 321, 17
N. W. 628 (1884); In re Bliss Estate, 247 Mich. 389, 225 N. W. 576 (1929).
16 Supra, note 9
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sensible division of his property; and the courts will sustain it, when
it appears that his mania didn't dictate its provisions." From this the
court in the principal case reasoned, "The converse of the proposition
is true, - that where the monomania or delusion does dictate its pro-
visions and results in the disinheritance of the subjects of the delusion,
whom he would otherwise remember in his will, it cannot stand." In
Haines v. Hayden 17 the court charged the jury, "If you shall find as
a matter of fact that, at the time the will in question was executed,
the testator was laboring under an insane delusion or mania, from
whatever source he may have derived it; that this story was untrue;
that he came to believe it was true, and acted upon that belief; and
that it was the cause of his making the unequal disposition of his
property evidenced by the terms of the will, as between his wife and
daughter; when, in fact, the whole story was false, and had no reason
or probability for its foundation, - then I charge you, that was such
a mental delusion or derangement as would avoid the will." The
court in its charge also said, "Monomania is insanity upon a single
subject. It is an insane delusion which renders the person afflicted
incapable of reasoning upon that particular subject;. he assumes to
believe that to be true which has no reason or foundation in fact on
which to found his belief a person persistently believing supposed
facts which have no real existence, against all evidence and probability
and conducting himself upon the assumption of their existence, is, so
far as such facts are concerned, under an insane delusion." Upon ap-
peal of this case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the charge
correctly embodied the law upon the subject.
Testators, with physical defects, or testators who use intoxicants,
or narcotics, in making a will must come under the general test of
mental capacity or the will is invalid. That is, he must realize the
nature and extent of his property, the natural objects of his bounty
and the disposition he is making of his estate. Intoxication doesn't
avoid a will, unless it prevents the testator from acting with compre-
hension. But it will have a bearing on his capacity, if it- exists to such
an extent as to prevent his excercising self control and knowing what
be is doing. Intoxication at other times than when the will was executed
has no bearing on the subject at hand. The court in Pierce v. Pierce 18
said, "There is no foundation in reason or authority, that we have
found for holding that a will is void for the intoxication of the testator.
17 95 Mich. 332, 54 N. W. 911 (1892).
18 Supra, note 10. Continued: Hibbard v. Baker, 141 Mich. 124, 104 N. W.
399 (1906) held, "Habits of untidiness which increased with advancing years Isn't
evidence of insanity." In the case of Blackman v. Andrews, 114 N. W. 218 (1907),
the court said, "Merely because the testator wouldn't exhaust the subject of his
conversation, is no evidence of insanity." Lengwell v. Bettinghouse, 151 Mich.
513, 115 N. W. 731 (1908).
